Infrastructure Sharing for Mobile Network Operators: Analysis of
  Trade-offs and Market by Sanguanpuak, Tachporn et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
07
97
4v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 23
 Se
p 2
01
7
1
Infrastructure Sharing for Mobile Network
Operators: Analysis of Trade-offs and Market
Tachporn Sanguanpuak∗, Sudarshan Guruacharya†, Ekram Hossain†,
Nandana Rajatheva∗, and Matti Latva-aho∗
Abstract
The conflicting problems of growing mobile service demand and underutilization of dedicated
spectrum has given rise to a paradigm where mobile network operators (MNOs) share their infrastructure
among themselves in order to lower their operational costs, while at the same time increase the usage
of their existing network resources. We model and analyze such an infrastructure sharing system
considering a single buyer MNO and multiple seller MNOs. Assuming that the locations of the BSs can
be modeled as a homogeneous Poisson point process, we find the downlink signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) coverage probability for a user served by the buyer MNO in an infrastructure sharing
environment. We analyze the trade-off between increasing the transmit power of a BS and the intensity
of BSs owned by the buyer MNO required to achieve a given quality-of-service (QoS) in terms of the
SINR coverage probability. Also, for a seller MNO, we analyze the power consumption of the network
per unit area (i.e., areal power consumption) which is shown to be a piecewise continuous function of
BS intensity, composed of a linear and a convex function. Accordingly, the BS intensity of the seller
MNO can be optimized to minimize the areal power consumption while achieving a minimum QoS for
the buyer MNO. We then use these results to formulate a single-buyer multiple-seller BS infrastructure
market. The buyer MNO is concerned with finding which seller MNO to purchase from and what
fraction of BSs to purchase. On the sellers’ side, the problem of pricing and determining the fraction
of infrastructure to be sold is formulated as a Cournot oligopoly market. We prove that the iterative
update of each seller’s best response always converges to the Nash Equilibrium.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
In recent years, the concept of network infrastructure sharing has been investigated to address
two kinds of concerns. On one hand, with the growing demand for mobile services, the un-
derutilization of dedicated spectrum auctioned off to the mobile network operators (MNOs) has
become a bottleneck for the future growth of the industry [1]. While on the other hand, in areas
or time periods where demand can be low – such as in rural areas or developing countries, or
during night time – the high cost of network infrastructure forces the operators to charge higher
prices from their customers, making the mobile services unaffordable to many people, hence
further driving down the demand [2], [3]. As capacity demand is expected to increase, MNOs
are required to increase their capital (CAPEX) and operational expenses (OPEX) accordingly.
One possible paradigm to address these issues is to allow the MNOs to share their infrastructures
in order to maximize the use of existing network resources while simultaneously minimizing the
operational costs [1], [2], [3].
In [4], the third generation partnership project (3GPP) has defined standards for network
sharing. Accordingly, by sharing the infrastructure among the MNOs, it also allows for a faster
deployment of network services. Such sharing of infrastructure can be passive or active. Passive
sharing refers to the sharing of physical space, such as buildings, sites, masts, and power supply.
In active sharing, active elements of the network such as antennas, backhaul, base stations,
and elements of core network are shared. Thus, such active sharing allows mobile roaming,
which allows an MNO to make use of another network in a place where it has no coverage
or infrastructure of its own. According to a market survey in [5], infrastructure sharing has
been deployed by over 65% of European MNOs, involving both active and passive radio access
network (RAN) sharing. This trend is expected to grow in the future. In recent years, the concept
of drone base stations (BSs) has been introduced [6]. The concept of sharing can also be extended
to drone-based infrastructures.
B. Related Work and Contribution
In [7], the neutral host network deployment was proposed where the MNOs deploy cells in
the best positions with optimal tuning to satisfy the quality-of-experience (QoE). The technical
and the financial impact of infrastructure sharing was investigated in [8]. In [9], RAN sharing
was considered based on BS virtualization, which allows multiple entities to share the same
spectrum. In [10], the benefit of inter-operator spectrum sharing was demonstrated. Resource
3sharing in the context of heterogeneous network and cloud RAN concepts was proposed in
[11]. In [12], a service-oriented framework for RAN sharing which decouples MNOs from radio
resource by providing application-level differentiated services was studied. In [13], the authors
studied infrastructure sharing along with BS switch off mechanism. In [14], game theory was
applied to study multi-operator infrastructure sharing for BS de-activation. The work in [8]–[14]
considered deterministic network models.
In [15], stochastic geometry was used to investigate infrastructure sharing, spectrum sharing,
and the combination of two in large-scale cellular networks. When both types of sharing are
allowed, the authors showed that a trade-off exists between coverage and data rate performance.
In [16], the point processes that model the spatial characteristics of the BSs belonging to
multiple MNOs were empirically studied, using the data from field surveys. In [17], the authors
also exploited stochastic geometry to study the trade-off involved in spectrum sharing and
infrastructure sharing.
In this paper, we model and analyze the infrastructure sharing problem in a large-scale cellular
network by exploiting tools and results from stochastic geometry. The tradeoff between transmit
power and the intensity of the BS deployment for a buyer MNO and that between the areal
power consumption and the BS intensity for the seller MNO are analyzed in an infrastructure
sharing scenario. Also, the market competition among MNOs for selling and buying infrastructure
is modeled and analyzed. Although the problem of spectrum and infrastructure sharing was
considered in [15], the tradeoffs as well as the market were not analyzed. Note that in [18],
we modeled and analyzed the problem of spectrum sharing among network operators using a
stochastic geometry approach.
We consider multiple co-located deployment of network infrastructures by different MNOs,
where the MNOs are assumed to operate over orthogonal frequency bands. In the infrastructure
sharing deployment, each BS can be utilized by the users subscribed to more than one MNO.
The MNOs that install the BS are considered as potential sellers of the BS infrastructure (i.e.
incumbent MNOs). The entrant MNO that use the BS of the incumbent MNOs to serve their
users is considered as the buyer. In the presence of multiple seller MNOs, it is assumed that
they compete with each other to sell their infrastructure to a potential buyer. Note that our study
in this paper focuses only on infrastructure sharing among the MNOs. We consider that BSs are
randomly scattered in two dimensional 2D plane. First, we study the strategy of a buyer MNO,
that decides which MNOs to buy the infrastructure from, and how much infrastructure to buy
from them. We propose a cost minimization problem for the buyer MNO, while guaranteeing the
quality-of-service (QoS) to its users, in terms of the SINR coverage probability, as an optimization
4problem. Next, we propose the market from the point of view of the sellers, which compete with
each other to sell the infrastructure. We model the competition among the seller MNOs as a
Cournot-Nash game. The seller MNOs compete with each other in terms of their supply (a
fraction of infrastructure to be shared), the associated cost (e.g. due to power consumption
at the BSs), and the selling price, with the objective of gaining the highest profit. As such
we find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and obtain the equilibrium price. We use results from
stochastic geometric analysis of large-scale networks to evaluate SINR outage probability and
power consumption to model such a market.
The major contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• The paper presents an infrastructure sharing model with multiple seller MNOs and single
MNO. The downlink SINR coverage probability, which is considered to be the QoS metric
for the buyer MNO, is analyzed using stochastic geometry.
• Subsequently, the trade-off between increasing the transmit power of a BS versus increasing
the BS deployment density for the buyer MNO is analyzed. It is shown that there is an upper
bound beyond which increasing the transmit power cannot improve the coverage probability.
Infrastructure sharing is beneficial when the QoS is above this bound. Infrastructure sharing
can improve the cellular coverage as long as the BS interference and BS association are
decoupled.
• For a seller MNO, since its profit depends on its cost of network operation, the areal power
consumption (i.e., power consumption per unit area) at the BSs is analyzed.
• The optimal strategy for the buyer MNO, in order to minimize the cost of purchase, is
obtained by using Lagrange multiplier method. We use greedy algorithm to find which
seller MNO and how much infrastructure to purchase from.
• The optimal strategy for the seller MNOs, in terms of the fraction of infrastructure to be
shared and the pricing for the infrastructure, is obtained by computing the equilibrium of a
Cournot-Nash market/game.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the system model and the
assumptions. Section III gives the stochastic geometrical analysis of the downlink SINR coverage
probability of a typical user based on two scenarios: (i) all the BSs of the seller MNOs serve UEs
subscribing to the buyer MNO (i.e., interference is caused at the reference user from downlink
transmissions of all BSs of all of the seller MNOs as well those from the buyer MNO’s) and (ii)
some of the BSs of the seller MNOs serve UEs subscribing to the buyer MNO (i.e., interference
5is caused at the reference UE from a fraction of all the BSs of the MNOs including those from
the buyer MNO’s). The trade-off between transmit power and infrastructure (i.e., intensity of
BSs) is analyzed in Section IV. Section V models the strategic behavior of a buyer MNO when
buying infrastructure from multiple seller MNOs. Section VI analyzes the competition among
multiple sellers using a Cournot-Nash game. The numerical results are presented in Section VII
before the paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Consider a system withK+1MNOs given by the set K = {0, 1, . . . , K} that serves a common
geographical area. We consider multiple sellers single buyer market for infrastructure sharing.
We assume that an MNO cannot be both buyer and seller at the same time. Let MNO-0 denote
our buyer MNO. Let the set of BSs owned by MNO-k be given by Fk, where k ∈ K. Each of the
BSs and UEs are assumed to be equipped with a single antenna. The maximum transmit power of
each BS is pmax. Also, a UE subscribed to an MNO associates to the nearest BS belonging to that
MNO. The BSs owned by different MNOs are spatially distributed according to homogeneous
Poisson point processes (PPPs). Let the spatial intensity of BSs per unit area of MNO-k be
denoted by λk, where k ∈ K. Furthermore, each MNO-k, is assumed to operate on orthogonal
spectrum. Thus, there is no inter-operator interference among the MNOs. However, since the all
the BSs belonging to an MNO utilize a common spectrum, intra-operator interference is present.
During the sharing of infrastructure, the following assumptions hold:
Assumption 1. When the buyer MNO-0 is allowed to use the infrastructure of a seller MNO-k,
where k ∈ K\{0}, the typical UE of MNO-0 associates with the nearest available BSs owned
by MNO-0 or the seller MNO-k.
If the buyer MNO-0 shares infrastructure withN ⊆ K\{0} seller MNOs, then a UE subscribed
to MNO-0 can effectively associate to any one of the enlarged set of BSs given by F =
F0 ∪ (∪k∈NFk). This implies that the net intensity of the BSs that a typical UE of MNO-0 can
associate itself with is
λA = λ0 +
∑
k∈N
λk, (1)
due to the superposition property of PPP. In places where it is not ambiguous, we can denote
the overall net intensity of the BSs of all MNOs as sum of all λk by,
λ = λ0 +
∑
k∈N
λk.
6Assumption 2. The buyer MNO-0 is assumed to use the infrastructure, but not the spectrum,
belonging to a seller MNO-k, where k ∈ K\{0}. As such a UE of MNO-0 served by the shared
BS of a seller MNO-k has to operate on the spectrum belonging to the MNO-0 itself. We will
consider two possible cases for the interference experienced by the typical UE of MNO-0:
1) When every shared BS of the seller MNOs serves a user from MNO-0, we have the intensity
of interfering BSs as
λI = λ0 +
∑
k∈N
λk = λA (2)
2) When only some of the BSs of the seller MNOs serve users from MNO-0, the intensity of
interfering BSs is given by
λI =
∑
k∈N∪{0}
wkλk (3)
where wk denotes the level of activity of UE of MNO-0 using infrastructure of seller
MNO-k, such that k ∈ N , and ∑k∈N∪{0}wk = 1. In this case, λA is given by (1).
Note that despite the sharing of BSs among MNOs, there is no inter-operator interference
among MNOs in our system model, since each MNO operates over a different spectrum. Due to
Assumption 2, the buyer will purchase only the infrastructure of the seller MNOs and not the
spectrum. Assumption 2.1 is a worst case assumption, while Assumption 2.2 is a more realistic
assumption. While in Assumption 2.1 λI = λA, in Assumption 2.2 λI and λA are de-coupled.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: The buyer MNO-0 buys infrastructure from seller MNOs.
Fig. 1 illustrates the scenarios when the MNO-0 buys infrastructure from two seller MNOs,
namely, MNO-1 (with 1 BS) and MNO-2 (with 2 BSs). In Fig. 1(a), all of the BSs of MNO-1 and
7MNO-2 serve users (e.g. user equipment; UE-1, UE-2, and UE-3) subscribing to MNO-0 (which
is described by Assumption 2.1), while in Fig. 1(b), only some shared BSs of seller MNOs (e.g.
BS-2 of MNO-2) serve at least one UE of MNO-0 (which is described by Assumption 2.2).
III. ANALYSIS OF DOWNLINK SINR COVERAGE PROBABILITY FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE
SHARING SYSTEM
Without loss of generality, we consider a typical UE of MNO-0 located at the origin, which
associates with the nearest BS in the enlarged set of BSs given by F . We will denote the nearest
BS from F to the typical UE as BS-0. We assume that the message signal undergoes Rayleigh
fading with the channel power gain given by g0. Furthermore, let α > 2 denote the path-loss
exponent for the path-loss model r−α0 , where r0 is the distance between the typical UE and BS-
0. Finally, let σ2 denote the noise variance, and p denote the transmit power of all the BSs in
MNO-0, including BS-0. The downlink SINR at the typical UE is SINR =
g0r
−α
0
p
I+σ2
, where I is the
interference experienced by a typical UE from the BSs that operate on the spectrum of MNO-0.
These are the BSs that belong to MNO-k, where k ∈ N ∪ {0}. Thus, I = ∑i∈F\{0} ξigir−αi p.
Here gi is the co-channel gain between the typical UE and interfering BS-i, and ri is the distance
between the typical UE and the interfering BS-i, where i ∈ F\{0}. The transmit power of each
BS is 0 < p ≤ pmax. Lastly, ξi ∈ {0, 1} is a binary variable indicating whether the BS-i is active
(if ξi = 1) or inactive (if ξi = 0) in the spectrum of MNO-0.
For a given threshold T , the SINR coverage probability for the typical UE of MNO-0’s cellular
network is defined as: Pc = Pr(SINR > T ). While the case when λA = λI has been explored
in [20], similar method can be used to find a more general formula for the coverage probability
when λA 6= λI . Following [20, Theorem 1], we first condition on the nearest BS at the distance
r0 from a typical UE. The coverage probability averaged over r0 is
Pc =
∫
r>0
Pr(SINR > T | r0)fr0(r)dr, (4)
where the probability density function of r0 is given by, fr0(r) = e
−πλAr202πλAr0. We have
Pc =
∫
r>0
Pr
(
g0r
−α
0 p
I + σ2
> T | r0
)
e−πλAr
2
2πλAr0dr0. (5)
Using the fact that the distribution of the Rayleigh fading channel power gain follows an
exponential distribution exp
(
1
p
)
, the coverage probability can be expressed as
Pr[g0 > Tr
α
0 (σ
2 + I) | r0] = EI [e−
Trα
0
p
(σ2+I) | r0] = e−
Tσ2rα
0
p LI
(
Trα0
p
)
,
8where EI [.] is expectation taken with respect to the interference power, LI(s) is the Laplace
transform of the random variable I evaluated at s =
Trα
0
p
, conditioned on the distance to the
closest BS from the origin. It yields the coverage expression
Pc =
∫
r>0
e−πλAr
2
0e−
Tσ2rα
0
p LI
(
Trα0
p
)
2πλAr0dr0. (6)
For a homogeneous PPP, LI(
Trα
0
p
) is given by
LI
(
Trα0
p
)
= exp
{
λIπ(1− β)r20
}
, where (7)
β =
2(T/p)2/α
α
Eg[g
2/α(Γ(−2/α, Tg/p))− Γ(−2/α)], (8)
in which Γ(z) is the Gamma function, while Γ(z, a) =
∫∞
z
xa−1e−xdx is the upper incom-
plete Gamma function, and Eg[.] is the expectation taken with respect to interferers’ channel
distribution g.
Proposition 1. The general expression of the coverage probability for the typical UE of MNO-0
cellular network is
Pc = πλA
∫ ∞
0
exp{−(Az +Bzα/2)}dz, (9)
where the coefficients A and B are given by
A = π[(λI(β − 1)) + λA], B = Tσ
2
p
. (10)
Proof: A formula for a coverage probability of the typical UE when the BSs are distributed
according to a homogeneous PPP of intensity λ is derived in [20, Eqn.2]. Substituting (7) in (6)
and changing the variable r20 → z, we can express the coverage probability as
Pc =
∫
z>0
e−
Tσ2
p
zα/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
e−π(λI (β−1))z︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference
e−λAπzπλA︸ ︷︷ ︸
user association
dz. (11)
Here the integrand in (11) comprises of terms related to noise, interference, and user association,
while each BS employs a constant power p. We can express (11) as (9) with the coefficients A
and B as given in (10).
When the interfering links undergo Rayleigh fading, β = 1 + ρ(T, α), where
ρ(T, α) = T 2/α
∫ ∞
T−2/α
(1 + uα/2)−1du. (12)
For this special case, we see that β is independent of transmit power.
9Except for α = 4, Pc cannot be evaluated in closed form. Nevertheless, a simple closed-
form approximation for the general case, where α > 2, and where both noise and intra-operator
interference are present, can be given as [21, Eqn. 4]
Pc ≃ πλA
[
A +
α
2
B2/α
Γ
(
2
α
)]−1 , (13)
where Γ(z) is the Gamma function. For “interference-limited case”, which occurs when σ2 → 0,
we have B → 0; therefore, the above approximation simplifies to
Pc ≃ λA
(λI(β − 1)) + λA . (14)
The significance of the approximation in (13) is that it allows us to study the asymptotic
behavior of Pc. These asymptotic results give us a qualitative understanding of the system as
various parameters change. Likewise, we can use (13) to obtain the required transmit power p
for given QoS, as we will see in the later sections.
In Propositions 2 – 5 in Sections III-A and III-B below, we examine the coverage probability
of buyer MNO-0 when every BS (Assumption 2.1) and when some of BSs (Assumption 2.2)
of seller MNOs serve the users of MNO-0. In Proposition 6 in Section III-C, we show the
coverage probability for the case when MNO-0 uses its own infrastructure. Also, for all these
cases, the asymptotic behavior of coverage probability is expressed accordingly.
A. SINR Coverage Analysis When Assumption 2.1 Holds
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2.1, the coverage probability of a typical
UE of buyer MNO-0 is
Pc = πλ
∫ ∞
0
exp{−(A1z +Bzα/2)}dz, (15)
where A1 = πλβ, and β and B are given by (8) and (9), respectively. Then, we can approximate
Pc using (13) as
Pc ≃
[
β +
α
2πλ
B2/α
Γ
(
2
α
)]−1 . (16)
Proof: As per Assumption 2.1, we have λI = λA = λ. Substituting these values in
Proposition 1, we obtain (15). The approximation (16) is obtained by applying (13).
Proposition 3. Asymptotic behavior of Pc: (i) When the number of seller MNOs (N) is fixed,
as the BS intensity of MNO-0 increases such that λ0 → ∞, the coverage of MNO-0 saturates
at 1
β
. (ii) For a fixed BS intensity of MNO-0, as the number of seller MNOs (N) increases, the
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coverage probability also saturates at 1
β
. (iii) For fixed number of seller MNOs (N), if MNO-0
does not have its own infrastructure such that λ0 = 0, then Pc ≃
[
β + α
2πΓ( 2
α
)
B2/α∑N
i=1 λi
]−1
.
Proof: From the closed-form approximation in (16), we can see that (i) When λ0 → ∞,
since B and
∑N
k=0 λk remain constant, Pc → 1/β. (ii) When N → ∞, since B and and λ0β
are constants, Pc → 1/β. (iii) When λ0 = 0, A1 = πβ
∑N
i=1 λi. Simplifying (16), we obtain the
desired results.
B. SINR Coverage Analysis When Assumption 2.2 Holds
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2.2, the downlink coverage probability of
a typical user of buyer MNO-0 is
Pc = πλ
∫ ∞
0
exp{−(A2z +Bzα/2)}dz, (17)
where A2 = π(
∑
k∈N∪{0}wkλk(β−1)+λ), and the B and β are given by (8) and (9), respectively.
Also, the approximate Pc for this case is
Pc ≃
[
1 +
λ¯(β − 1)
λ
+
α
2πλ
B2/α
Γ( 2
α
)
]−1
, (18)
where λ¯ =
∑
k∈N∪{0}wkλk and wk = λk/λ.
Proof: As per Assumption 1, we have λA = λ, while according to Assumption 2.2, we
have λI =
∑
k∈N∪{0}wkλk. Substituting these values in Proposition 1, we have the desired
result in (17). Also, using the approximation (13) for (17), we obtain (18). Lastly, wk is the
activity level of users of MNO-0 in another MNO-k, which is equivalent to the probability that
a user associates with shared BSs belonging to MNO-k. That is, wk is the probability that the
BS belonging to MNO-k is the nearest BS to the typical user. Since the total intensity of BSs
that a user can associate with is λ, due to superposition property, wk = λk/λ is the probability
that a user will connect to a BS belonging to MNO-k.
Proposition 5. Asymptotic behavior of Pc: (i) For fixed number of seller MNOs (N), when the
BS intensity of the buyer MNO-0 increases (λ0 → ∞), the coverage of MNO-0 saturates at
1/β. (ii) For fixed BS intensity of MNO-0, as the number of seller MNOs (N) increases, the
coverage of MNO-0 increases and then saturates to 1. That is, if limN→∞
∑
i∈N λi = ∞ and
limN→∞ λ¯/λ = 0, then limN→∞ Pc = 1, (iii) For fixed number of seller MNOs (N), if MNO-0
does not have its own infrastructure, then Pc ≃
[
1 + λ¯(β−1)∑N
i=1 λi
+ α
2πΓ( 2
α
)
B2/α∑N
i=1 λi
]−1
.
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Proof: From the approximation in (18), (i) using wi = λi/λ, we have
λ¯
λ
=
∑
i∈N∪{0} λ
2
i
λ2
=
∑
i∈N∪{0} λ
2
i
(
∑
i∈N∪{0} λi)
2
.
Dividing both the numerator and denominator on the right side by λ20, we obtain
λ¯
λ
=
1 +
∑
i∈N∪{0}(
λi
λ0
)2
[1 +
∑
i∈N∪{0}(
λi
λ0
)]2
.
Therefore, when λ0 → ∞, we have limλ0→∞ λ¯λ = 1. Since B remains constant, α2πλ B
2/α
Γ( 2
α
)
→ 0.
Thus, we have Pc → 1/β.
(ii) As N → ∞, given our assumptions, λ¯/λ → 0. Similarly, since B remains constant,
α
2πλ
B2/α
Γ( 2
α
)
→ 0. Thus, we have Pc → 1.
(iii) When λ0 = 0, we have λ =
∑
i∈N∪{0} λi. Thus, we obtain the desired result.
Note that Proposition 5 (i) is valid not only when λ0 → ∞, but also when any λi → ∞.
In our case, an increase in the BS intensity does not correspond to an increase in co-channel
interference, which is different from [20]. Proposition 5 also confirms our intuition that a greater
sharing of infrastructure leads to a better coverage. Increasing the buyer MNO-0’s infrastructure
also leads to coverage improvement.
We can see that when the number of seller MNOs (N) increases, the coverage of the buyer
MNO-0 saturates at 1 following Proposition 5 (ii). This leads to the main difference between
Proposition 3 and Proposition 5. In Proposition 3, although the number of sellers increased,
the maximum coverage of MNO-0 leads to only 1/β.
C. When the MNO-0 Employs its Own Infrastructure
For the case when the MNO-0 uses its own infrastructure, the coverage probability can be
obtained as follows.
Proposition 6. The coverage of MNO-0 without buying infrastructure is approximated as
Pc ≃
[
β +
α
2πλ0
B2/α
Γ
(
2
α
)]−1 . (19)
Proof: Without infrastructure sharing, the interference is only from BSs of MNO-0. Thus,
λI = λ0, regardless of Assumption 2.1 or Assumption 2.2. Also, the user can associate only
with the BSs of MNO-0. Thus, λA = λ0. Hence, using (13) we obtain the desired result.
Asymptotically, Pc → 1/β as λ0 →∞, since B remains constant.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF TRADE-OFFS
A. Minimum Transmit Power Required to Satisfy the QoS
In the Propositions 7 and 8 below, we express the minimum transmit power for each BS of
the buyer MNO-0 to achieve the coverage QoS when every BS (Assumption 2.1) and when
some of BSs (Assumption 2.2) of seller MNOs serve the users of MNO-0. Let us further assume
that the MNO-0 wants to ensure that the coverage probability of a typical UE satisfies the QoS
constraint
Pc ≥ 1− ǫ, (20)
where 0 < ǫ < 1 is some arbitrary value. In order to satisfy the coverage constrain in (20),
the minimum power required for each BS of MNO-0, for given infrastructure, is given by the
following proposition.
Proposition 7. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2.1 hold. Assume that the interfering links
undergo Rayleigh fading and λ be defined as before. Then, given the condition that 1−ǫ < 1/β,
where β is given by (8), the minimum transmit power required for each BS of MNO-0 such that
Pc ≥ 1− ǫ, is
p ≃ c0λ−α/2, where c0 =
[
2π(1− (1− ǫ)β)
α(1− ǫ)(Tσ2)2/αΓ
(
2
α
)]−α/2
. (21)
Proof: When the interfering links undergo Rayleigh fading, β = 1 + ρ, as given in (12),
and is independent of p. Thus, using (13) in the inequality Pc ≥ 1 − ǫ, and solving for p, we
obtain the desired result. For p > 0, it suffices that 1 − β(1 − ǫ) > 0 in the expression for c0.
Re-arranging the terms gives the desired result.
Proposition 8. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2.2 hold. We assume that the interfering links
undergo Rayleigh fading and λ be defined as before. Then, given the sufficient condition that
1 − ǫ < 1/β ′, where β ′ = 1 + λ¯(β−1)
λ
, the minimum transmit power required for each BS of
MNO-0 such that Pc ≥ 1− ǫ, is
p ≃ ĉ0λ−α/2, where ĉ0 =
[
2π(1− (1− ǫ)β ′)
α(1− ǫ)(Tσ2)2/α Γ(
2
α
)
]−α/2
. (22)
Proof: When the interfering links undergo Rayleigh fading, β = 1+ρ, as given in (12), and
is independent of p. Thus, using (13) in the inequality Pc ≥ 1− ǫ, and solving for p, we obtain
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the desired result. For p > 0, it suffices that 1 − (1 − ǫ)(1 + β ′) > 0 in the expression for ĉ0.
Here β ′ = 1+ λ¯(β−1)
λ
and λ¯ =
∑N
i=0wiλi. Re-arranging the terms gives the sufficient condition.
According to Proposition 7 and Proposition 8, for a given QoS, the transmit power of the
BSs of an MNO should decrease with increasing BS intensity. For instance, if α = 4, then
p ∝ 1√
λ
. Then, we will use (21) for Assumption 2.1, and (22) for Assumption 2.2 to obtain
the minimum transmit power from BS of MNO-0, when there is no infrastructure sharing. Also,
we will obtain the optimal cell radius of a BS of MNO-0 when using the minimum power.
B. Trade-off Between Power and Infrastructure
Every MNO wishes to guarantee a certain probability of coverage to its own customers.
For this purpose, if a UE is experiencing outage, the MNO can either choose to increase the
transmit power of the BSs so as to increase the coverage radius, or offload the call to a shared
BS. It is natural to look at the possible trade-off between increasing the power and sharing more
infrastructure.
Intuitively, in both Proposition 7 and Proposition 8, the minimum required transmit power
decreases with increasing BS densification.
• For Assumption 2.1 the sufficiency condition 1/β is the maximum attainable coverage
probability as the transmit power p → ∞ and as the system becomes interference limited
(i.e., B → 0). That is, we have the upper bound Pc ≤ 1/β. Thus, the QoS, 1 − ǫ, can be
achieved by varying the transmit power only when 1− ǫ < 1/β.
• Similarly, for Assumption 2.2, the sufficiency condition 1/β ′ is the maximum attainable
coverage probability when the transmit power p → ∞ such that B → 0. The QoS, 1 − ǫ,
can be achieved by varying the transmit power only when 1− ǫ < 1/β ′.
We can see that if the sufficient conditions for the cases with Assumption 2.1 and Assumption
2.2 are violated, MNO-0 cannot satisfy the outage QoS by simply varying the transmit power.
The MNO-0 will have to buy more infrastructure from other MNOs.
Let R be the cell radius of a BS defined as the distance at which a UE will receive −3 dB
SNR. Then, for the important special cases when there is no infrastructure sharing, we have the
following scaling law as a corollary.
Corollary 1. When there is no infrastructure sharing, the minimum BS transmit power of
Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 2.2 for which 1− ǫ < 1/β are
1) From Assumption 2.1, the minimum transmit power is p ≃ c0λ−α/20 , where c0 is given in
(21) and c0 is independent of λ0. The optimal cell radius is R ≃ c
′
0√
λ0
, where c′0 =
(
2c0
σ2
)1/α
.
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2) From Assumption 2.2, the minimum transmit power is p ≃ ĉ0λ−α/20 , where ĉ0 is given in
(22) such that β ′ = β, and ĉ0 is independent of λ0. We can obtain the optimal cell radius
as R ≃ ĉ′0√
λ0
, where ĉ′0 =
(
2ĉ0
σ2
)1/α
.
Proof: When there is no infrastructure sharing, it means that N = ∅ and we have λ = λ0.
Since the cell edge is defined as the distance at which SNR is −3 dB, we have
pR−α
σ2
=
1
2
. (23)
Using Proposition 7 and Proposition 8, the proofs are as follows: (i) Given Assumption 2.1,
putting p = c0λ
−α/2
0 from (21) in (23), we can solve for R to obtain the result. (ii) Similarly,
given Assumption 2.2, in (22) λ¯ = λ0 without infrastructure sharing. Also β
′ = β. Thus, we
obtain required minimum transmit power in the Corollary 1. Then, putting p = ĉ0λ
−α/2
0 in (23),
we can solve for R to obtain the result.
A scaling law similar to Corollary 1 can be found in [22, Lemma 1] and [23, Lemma 1]
for homogeneous PPP, using a slightly different approximation, as p ∝ λ−α/2+10 . However, our
formula differs from theirs in the order of the exponent as well as the proportionality constant.
Likewise, the scaling law for the cell radius, R ∝ 1/√λ0, corresponds to that obtained by [24]
for hexagonal grid model.
C. Areal Power Consumption of Seller MNO
In Propositions 9 and 10 below, we express the areal power consumption as a function of
BS intensity of seller MNO and show the convexsity of the areal power consumption.
Let the transmit power of each BS belonging to the seller MNO-k, where k ∈ K\{0}, be
denoted by pk. Apart from the transmit power, each BS also consumes a fixed amount of circuit
power, denoted by pc. Hence, the total power consumption of a BS of an MNO-k is pk + pc.
Since the MNO-k has λk BS per unit area, the areal power consumption of the network (i.e.,
power consumption per unit area) is
Sk = λk(pk + pc). (24)
For MNO-k, let the QoS constaint on coverage probability of a typical UE be Pc ≥ 1 − ǫ
and the threshold SINR be Tk. In order to satisfy this constraint, it can either increase its BS
intensity λk or increase its transmit power pk. The trade-off between λk and pk was given by
Proposition 7. Similarly, the trade-off between λk and Sk follow immediately.
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Proposition 9. Given the assumptions in Proposition 7, the areal power consumption of seller
MNO-k, where k ∈ K\{0}, is
Sk(λk) =
{
λk(pmax + pc), if 0 ≤ λk ≤ ( ckpmax )2/α,
λk(ckλ
−α/2
k + pc), if λk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α,
(25)
where ck =
[
2π(1−(1−ǫ)β)
α(1−ǫ)(Tkσ2)2/αΓ(
2
α
)
]−α/2
.
Proof: Since the MNO-k does not buy infrastructure from other MNOs, the net BS intensity
that a typical UE of MNO-k experiences is λk. Thus, from Corollary 1, we have pk ≃ ckλ−α/2k .
Putting pk in (24) and recalling that 0 < pk ≤ pmax, we have (25).
We see that Sk is a piece-wise continuous function of λk which initially increases linearly
with λk, and beyond a certain point, it behaves as a convex function. This can be verified by
checking the second derivative of Sk for λk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α as
d2Sk
dλ2k
=
ckα(α− 2)
4
λ
−α
2
−1
k . (26)
Since ck > 0 and α > 2, we have
d2Sk
dλ2k
> 0, proving the convexity of Sk in the region λk ≥
( ck
pmax
)2/α. As such, studying the behaviour of Sk is not straightforward. Nevertheless, the local
minima in the convex region can be found.
Proposition 10. Given the assumptions in Proposition 7 , let λth =
(
ck
pmax
)2/α
. Then, for the
region λk ≥ λth, the BS intensity for which the areal power consumption of MNO-k, where
k ∈ K\{0}, is minimum is
λk,min = max
(
λth,
[
ck
pc
(α
2
− 1
)]2/α)
. (27)
Proof: We have dSk/dλk = pc − (ck(α − 2)λ−α/2k )/2. Solving dSk/dλk = 0 for λk, we
have λ∗k = [
ck
pc
(α
2
− 1)]2/α. This is clearly the minima if λth < λ∗k. Otherwise, λk,min = λth.
Fig. 2: The areal power consumption (Sk) versus BS intensity (λk).
16
In Fig. 2, we illustrate Sk as a function of λk, as given in (25). We can see that it is composed
of linear and convex parts. The convex part of Sk corresponds to that obtained for hexagonal
grid models via simulations in [26]. Similar, but not the same, formulas were given in [22], [23].
V. ANALYSIS OF MARKET: BUYER’S STRATEGY
In this section, we propose a strategy for the buyer MNO-0 which will allow it to choose the
seller MNOs to buy the infrastructure from. By using our method, the buyer MNO will select the
necessary number of seller MNOs, at minimum cost, such that it can serve its UEs guaranteeing
some QoS. We have already seen in Propositions 7 and 8 and the discussion given in Section
IV-B that when the QoS constrain is such that 1− ǫ < 1/β ′ and 1− ǫ < 1/β, respectively, the
QoS can be satisfied by simply increasing the transmit power. As such, in this section, we will
consider the case when these conditions are violated. We first have the following proposition:
Proposition 11. Under Assumption 2.1, when the QoS condition Pc ≥ 1− ǫ > 1/β, the MNO-0
cannot improve its coverage by buying infrastructure.
Proof: Using the approximation (16) in (20) and solving for λ, we obtain the feasible
constraint of λ as
λ ≥ θ(1− ǫ)
1− β(1− ǫ) . (28)
where θ = α
2π
B2/α
Γ
(
2
α
) , for some N such that ∅ ⊆ N ⊆ K. For positivity, the denominator of (28)
should be 1 − β(1 − ǫ) > 0, which when re-arranged gives 1/β > 1 − ǫ. This contradicts our
assumption that 1− ǫ > 1/β.
Although this result seems counter-intuitive, it is not surprising when we recall that in Propo-
sition 3 (ii), even when the number of MNOs which are willing to share infrastructure increases
i.e. N →∞, the coverage of the BSs of MNO-0 can only achieve Pc → 1/β. Accordingly, it is
not possible for the MNO-0 to achieve the coverage beyond 1/β by buying more infrastructure
for the scenario of Assumption 2.1.
Proposition 12. Under Assumption 2.2, for the QoS condition Pc ≥ 1− ǫ > 1/β ′ to be feasible
for the buyer MNO-0, the net BS intensity λ = λ0 +
∑
i∈N λi must satisfy∑
i∈N∪{0}
(
1− wi(β − 1)(1− ǫ)
ǫ
)
λi ≥ θ(1− ǫ)
ǫ
, (29)
where wi =
λi
λ
and θ is as given in (28), for some N such that ∅ ⊆ N ⊆ K.
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Proof: Using the approximation (18) in (20) and substituting λ¯ =
∑N
i=0wiλi, and solving
for λ, we have the required result.
If there is a cost associated with the sharing of infrastructure, then we can formulate a cost
minimization problem with the QoS constraint as follows:
min
∑
k∈K\{0}
qkxk (30)
s.t. (C1)
∑
k∈K
[
1− λkxk(β − 1)(1− ǫ)
λǫ
]
λkxk ≥ θ(1− ǫ)
ǫ
,
where qk > 0 is the price of infrastructure when buying from MNO-k, where k ∈ K\{0}, xk
(0 ≤ xk ≤ 1) denotes the fraction of infrastructure bought from seller MNO-k. Also, note that
x0 = 1 since the buyer cannot buy infrastructure from itself. We can interpret xk in two possible
ways: 1) The buyer MNO-0 buys the entire infrastructure of MNO-k but utilizes the whole
infrastructure of MNO-k for only xk fraction of time, or 2) the MNO-0 buys only a fraction
xk of the total infrastructure of MNO-k, but utilizes it all the time. Thus the total amount of
infrastructure bought from MNO-k is λkxk. Since the objective function is linear, the single
constraint is quadratic in xk, and the variable xk is a fraction in [0, 1], the problem (30) becomes
a convex optimization problem.
The solution to the problem can be split into two parts. First, we need to find the optimal set
N , i.e., select MNOs from which to buy the infrastructure. Second, we need to determine the
optimal value of xk for k ∈ N . Assuming that we know N , we find the optimal value of xk
using Lagrange multiplier method. We have the Lagrangian of (30) as
L (µ, xk) =
∑
k∈N∪{0}
qkxk − 1
µ
(
θ(1− ǫ)
ǫ
−
∑
k∈N∪{0}
λkxk +
∑
k∈N∪{0}
λ2kx
2
k
λ
(β − 1)(1− ǫ)
)
. (31)
Here 1/µ is the Lagrange multiplier such that µ > 0. Note that here for k = 0, q0 = 0 and
x0 = 1. Taking first order partial derivative of L(µ, xk) with respect to xk for k ∈ N , we obtain
∂L(µ, xk)
∂xk
= qk +
λk
µ
− 2λ
2
kxk(β − 1)(1− ǫ)
µλ
. (32)
By using the first order optimality condition ∂L
∂xk
= 0, we obtain the optimal x∗k as
x∗k =
λ(µqk + λk)
2λ2k(β − 1)(1− ǫ)
. (33)
Substituting x∗k from (33) in the (C1) of (30) and setting it to be an equality, as per complementary
slackness condition, yields
∑
k∈N∪{0}
(
1− λkx∗k(β−1)(1−ǫ)
λǫ
)
λkx
∗
k =
θ(1−ǫ)
ǫ
. Then, solving for
optimal µ∗ gives,
µ∗ =
−F ±√F 2 − 4E(G−H)
2E
(34)
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where
E =
∑
k∈N∪{0}
λq2k
4λ2kǫ
, F =
∑
k∈N∪{0}
qkλ
(
1
2λkǫ
− 1
2λ2k
)
,
G =
∑
k∈N∪{0}
λ
(
1
4ǫ
− 1
2λk
)
, H =
θ(1− ǫ)2(β − 1)
ǫ
.
For the uniqueness of µ∗, we have an extra condition that the discriminant be zero, i.e,
F 2 − 4E(G−H) = 0 has to be satisfied. As such, by substituting E and F back to (34), and
setting F 2 − 4E(G−H) = 0, we obtain the unique solution of µ∗ as,
µ∗ =
∑
k∈N
qk
λk
(
ǫ
λk
− 1)∑
k∈N
(
qk
λk
)2 . (35)
Positivity of µ∗ is ensured if ǫ > λk for all k ∈ N .
Finally, substituting the unique µ∗ from (35) to (33), we obtain the optimal and unique solution
of x∗k. It is easy to verify that the obtained x
∗
k is positive, since in (33), the only way that x
∗
k
can be negative is when the denominator is negative, i.e., (β − 1)(1− ǫ) < 0. This condition is
equivalent to ǫ > 1, which is a contradiction. Thus, xk is always positive. However, the computed
value of x∗k can be greater than unity. Hence, we set x
∗
k = 1 if x
∗
k > 1.
Let us now consider finding the optimal N , which is essentially a combinatorial problem.
A simple greedy approach can be used for the selection of MNOs in N [25, Chap 17.1]. The
greedy algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1 to solve the problem in (30). The idea behind this
greedy algorithm is as follows: We first sort the seller MNOs according to their cost per BS
intensity values in an ascending order. We then select the first MNO in this list and compute
µ∗ and x∗k from (35) and (33), respectively. If xk > 1, then set xk = 1. After this, we check
whether the constrain (C1) in (30) is satisfied. If the (C1) is not satisfied, then we take the next
MNO from the list and repeat the procedure until the constrain is satisfied. The computational
complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(K2), since we need to compute x∗k for all k ∈ N in two nested
loops. A solution can be derived within K2 iterations.
VI. ANALYSIS OF MARKET: SELLERS’ COMPETITION
A. Cournot-Nash Oligopoly Market Model
In this part, we will study the equilibrium pricing due to the sellers’ competition as well as the
optimal fraction of infrastructure that the seller MNOs will be willing to sell. We will formulate
the sellers’ competition as a Cournot-Nash oligopoly game [27]. The Cournot oligopoly model is
suitable when there are limited number of sellers competing to sell homogeneous products. In our
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Algorithm 1 Greedy Algorithm
1: Initialize xk = 0, w = 0,
2: Compute ρk = qk/λk
3: Sort the sellers by ρk in ascending order such that ρπ1 ≤ ρπ2 · · · ≤ ρπK
4: for i = 1 to K do
5: Set N = {π1, . . . , πi}
6: Compute µ∗ using (35)
7: Compute x∗k using (33) for all k ∈ N
8: if x∗k > 1 for any k ∈ N then
9: Set x∗k = 1,
10: end if
11: if
∑
k∈N∪{0}
[
1− λkx∗k(β−1)(1−ǫ)
λǫ
]
λkx
∗
k ≥ θ(1−ǫ)ǫ , then
12: Terminate
13: end if
14: end for
15: Compute Pc from (18).
case, the product is the infrastructure provided by the seller MNOs. In the real world scenario,
there are limited number of MNOs that compete to sell some amount of their infrastructure.
Each seller MNO is selfish and is always interested in getting a better payoff. The MNOs do
not communicate with each other, thus they will not know exactly how much infrastructure is
being sold by their competitors. Also, the pricing will depend on the operational expense of the
shared infrastructure. As such, we will consider the cost of power consumption. Note that the
cost of spectrum does not come into play, since each seller MNO utilizes the spectrum of the
buyer MNO-0 to serve the users subscribing to the buyer MNO-0.
Let the fraction of infrastructure to be sold from the seller MNO-k, k ∈ K\{0}, be zk, where
0 ≤ zk ≤ 1. Then, the total amount of infrastructure sold by the seller MNO-k is yk = λkzk.
Let the cost of operating its infrastructure be Ck(yk), which we define as
Ck(yk) = akSk(yk) + dk, (36)
where ak is the price of areal power consumption, dk is a fixed operation cost, and Sk is as given
in (25). Let the overall infrastructure from K seller MNOs available in the market be denoted
by y =
∑K
k=1 yk. Also, let us denote the fraction of infrastructure of all MNOs except MNO-k
by y−k = y − yk.
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Let the selling price of the infrastructure be Q(y). In accordance to the “law of demand”
of economics, the seller MNOs will reduce the price when there is higher demand for the
infrastructure in the market. We will assume Q(y) to be
Q(y) = θ − ηy, (37)
where θ > 0 is the initial installation price of infrastructure from all seller MNOs and η > 0
denotes the marginal price of the total infrastructure y in the market. The MNO-k’s profit is
Fk(y1, . . . , yk) = ykQ(y)− Ck(yk). (38)
In order to maximize the profit of MNO-k with respect to yk, we first partially differentiate
(38) with respect to yk, and noting that ∂y/∂yk = 1, we obtain
∂Fk
∂yk
= yk
dQ
dy
+Q− dCk
dyk
. (39)
Using the optimality condition ∂Fk
∂yk
= 0 in (39) and solving for yk, we obtain
yk =
1
dQ
dy
(
dCk
dyk
−Q
)
, (40)
which is in a fixed-point form. Let us denote the function at the right hand side of (40) by
BRk(y−k) ≡ 1dQ
dy
(
dCk
dyk
−Q
)
, which we referred to as the best response of MNO-k to the action
of other competitive sellers. Also, we have dQ
dy
= −η, and
dCk
dyk
=
{
ak(pmax + pc), if 0 ≤ yk ≤ ( ckpmax )2/α
ak(1− α2 )cky−α/2k + akpc, if yk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α.
We see that the marginal cost of MNO-k is constant up until a certain point, after which the
marginal cost starts to monotonically increase. Thus, the action of MNO-k to sell yk amount of
infrastructure depends on the action of other MNOs, as given by the equation yk = BRk(y−k).
Substituting dCk
dyk
, dQ
dy
, and Q in (40),
yk =
{
Uk − y, if 0 ≤ yk ≤ ( ckpmax )2/α
Vky
−α/2
k +Wk − y, if yk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α,
(41)
where Uk =
ak(pmax+pc)−θ
−η , Vk =
ak(1−α2 )ck
−η and Wk =
akpc−θ
−η . Recalling that y = yk + y−k, we
obtain the best response of MNO-k as
yk =

Uk
2
− y−k
2
, if 0 ≤ yk ≤ ( ckpmax )2/α
Vky
−α/2
k
2
+ Wk
2
− y−k
2
, if yk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α.
(42)
Since yk ∈ [0, 1], the best response of MNO-k is clipped at (i) BRk(y−k) = 0 if BRk(y−k) < 0
or (ii) BRk(y−k) = λk if BRk(y−k) > λk. The status of the market is known from the global
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price information Q of the infrastructure in (37). Thus, the actions of the MNOs will be reflected
in the market price. An MNO adjusts its action according to the market price as given by its
best response function (37). In (37), the price Q will be fixed in a given iteration. Thus, it is
not necessary for each MNO to know the strategy of other MNOs.
B. Equilibrium of Market
The equilibrium solution of the Cournot-Nash oligopoly market, y∗, is the fixed point of the
best response function. As such, the best responses of allK seller MNOs can be expressed in vec-
tor form as y∗ = BR(y∗), where y∗ = [y∗1, y
∗
2, . . . , y
∗
K]
T and BR(y∗) = [BR1(y∗−1), . . . ,BRK(y
∗
−K)]
T .
The [.]T denotes transpose of vector. By taking summation of (42) over all K seller MNOs, and
using the fact that
∑
k∈K\{0} y
∗
−k =
∑
k∈K\{0}(y
∗−y∗k) = (K−1)y∗, we can solve the equilibrium
quantity y∗ as
y∗ =
1
K − 1
∑
k∈K\{0}
y∗−k. (43)
Once the equilibrium quantity y∗ is computed, we can find the corresponding equilibrium price
q∗ by substituting y∗ into the price function in (37), and we obtain q∗ = Q(y∗) = θ − ηy∗.
The equilibrium quantity and equilibrium price of the entire market can be calculated by using
Algorithm 2. First of all, we consider the competition among seller MNOs. Once we compute
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the sellers and obtain y∗ and q∗, the buyer MNO-0 will use
y∗ and q∗ to compute its best response which is given by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 Market Equilibrium Quantity and Price Between Sellers and Buyer
1: Consider competition among seller MNOs.
2: Compute the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of each seller MNO-k, y∗1, y
∗
2, . . . , y
∗
k.
3: Calculate y∗ from (43) and q∗ = Q(y∗) from (37).
4: Substitute y∗k → λk and q∗ in (30).
5: Use Algorithm 1 to find the optimal x∗k and N .
6: Compute Pc from (18).
Remark: When multiple buyer MNOs are considered, the buyer MNOs can use the same
infrastructure of the seller MNOs without affecting each other’s performance because the buyer
MNOs use their own spectrum that are orthogonal to each other. In this sense, there is no
competition among the buyers, as is assumed in our model. The buyers will only decide how
much infrastructure they need to buy at the given selling price and their required QoS.
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C. Stability of Nash Equilibrium of Cournot Oligopoly
The stability properties of the Cournot oligopoly game are discussed in [28], [29]. Considering
Assumption A and Assumptionn B.1 in [29], the sufficient conditions for our system to reach
the Nash Equilibrium, which also implies stability of the equilibrium are given as follows:
Proposition 13. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the oligopoly game is always stable, i.e. the
iterative updates of each seller best response always converge to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
since the following conditions are always satisfied.
Condition 1.
dQ(y)
dy
− d
2Ck(yk)
d2yk
< 0 ∀yk, Q, k (44)
Condition 2.
dQ(y)
dy
− ykd
2Q(y)
d2y
< 0 ∀yk, Q, k. (45)
Proof: For Condition 1, from (37) we can obtain
dQ(y)
dy
= −η. The second order partial
differentiate of Ck(yk) in (36) with respect to yk is
d2Ck(yk)
d2yk
= ak
d2Sk(yk)
d2yk
while using the fact
that yk = λkzk in (36) and
d2Sk(λk)
d2λk
from (26). We can express (44) as
dQ(y)
dy
− d
2Ck(yk)
d2yk
=
{
−η, 0 ≤ λk ≤ ( ckpmax )2/α
−η − ak d2Sk(λk)d2λk , λk ≥ (
ck
pmax
)2/α.
(46)
When 0 ≤ λk ≤ ( ckpmax )2/α, it is always true since η > 0 hence −η < 0. Also, when λk ≥
( ck
pmax
)2/α, where −η < 0, ak > 0 and from the proof in (26), d2Sk(λk)d2λk > 0; hence, the inequality
−η− ak d2Sk(λk)d2λk < 0 is always satisfied. For Condition 2, since
d2Q(y)
d2y
= 0 and dQ(y)
dy
= −η < 0,
the inequality in (45) is always true.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We assume that, for all K + 1 MNOs, the BSs are spatially distributed according to a
homogeneous PPP inside a circular area of 500 meter radius. The seller MNOs are assumed
to have the same intensity of BSs per unit area. The maximum transmit power of each BS is
pmax = 10 dBm, the SINR threshold at each user is T = 20 dB, the path-loss exponent is α = 5,
and noise σ2 = −150 dBm. Each BS from all MNOs transmits at the maximum power in Figs.
3-4. The price function for selling infrastructure from MNO-k, k ∈ K\{0} in (30) is set to
q = θ− ηy, where the fixed cost of installation of infrastructure for all seller MNOs is θ = 500
and the marginal price is η = 5π × 5002.
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Fig. 3: Coverage probability of a user of MNO-0
with increasing λ0.
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Fig. 4: Coverage probability of a user of MNO-0
when λ0 →∞.
A. Effect of Changing the Average Number of BSs of MNO-0 per Unit Area
In Fig. 3, the difference between coverage probability of a user of the buyer MNO-0 before and
after buying infrastructure is illustrated. When the MNO-0 buys infrastructure, it uses Algorithm
1 and the coverage probability is computed using (18). When infrastructure is not purchased,
the coverage probability is computed by using (19) in Proposition 6.
When MNO-0 uses its own infrastructure, we see that the coverage probability of a user of
MNO-0 approaches 1/β as λ0 increases. As such, the MNO-0 cannot simply increase its own
BS intensity to achieve a coverage more than the upper bound of 1/β. The MNO-0 will have to
buy more infrastructure to gain more coverage. When the buyer MNO-0 buys infrastructure from
seller MNOs using Algorithm 1, the coverage probability of MNO-0 is the same for ǫ = 0.1
and ǫ = 0.3. The coverage of MNO-0 improves significantly and becomes much greater than
1/β. When the BS intensity of seller MNO-k, k ∈ K\{0} increases, the coverage probability
of MNO-0 is increased. This verifies Proposition 5 (ii). Also, for fixed λk, where k ≥ 1, as
λ0 increases, the coverage of MNO-0 decreases, in accordance to Proposition 5 (i).
In Fig. 4, we illustrate the coverage probability a user of MNO-0 before and after buying
the infrastructure using a greedy algorithm when λ0 →∞. When the MNO-0 employs only its
own infrastructure, the coverage probability can be computed by using (19). When the MNO-
0 buys infrastructure, we assume the number of seller MNOs is six and the tolerable outage
probability ǫ = 0.1. It can be seen that Pc → 1/β when λ0 → ∞ for both the cases when
MNO-0 uses its own infrastructure and when MNO-0 buys infrastructure. When MNO-0 buys
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infrastructure, we only consider the scenario presented by Assumption 2.2, for which the buyer’s
coverage probability is given by (18) and the buyer’s strategy given by Algorithm 1. We see
that, after buying infrastructure, the coverage probability of a user of MNO-0 approaches the
bound 1/β ∼ 0.12. This verifies the asymptotic analysis in Proposition 5 (i).
B. Effect of Varying the QoS Parameter
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Fig. 6: Coverage probability of user of MNO-0
when varying the QoS ǫ.
In Figs. 5-6, we show the infrastructure bought by MNO-0 while increasing the value of
tolerable outage probability ǫ (i.e. Pc ≥ 1− ǫ). We assume that the fixed cost a and the price of
infrastructure b for the price function qk in (30) are the same for all seller MNOs. We consider
the cases when the buyer MNO-0 buys infrastructure from two, four, and six seller MNOs. Fig. 5
plots the fractional values of x =
∑K
i=1 xi, which indicates the total proportion of infrastructure
that MNO-0 purchases as ǫ changes. We see that as the tolerable outage ǫ increases, the required
amount of infrastructure decreases. For smaller values of ǫ, we see that, in order to satisfy its
QoS, the buyer eventually needs to purchase infrastructure from all the available sellers.
The difference between coverage probability of a user of MNO-0 before and after buying
infrastructure is shown in Fig. 6 for varying ǫ. We evaluate the buyer’s coverage probability
after executing Algorithm 1 for its purchasing strategy. We observe that for low values of ǫ,
MNO-0 is unable to satisfy the required QoS solely through its own infrastructure. As shown
in Fig. 5, MNO-0 needs to buy from all sellers. However, even after acquiring infrastructure
from all the available sellers, it may not be sufficient to satisfy its QoS. As such, for lower ǫ,
the coverage probability saturates at a value less than 1− ǫ. When ǫ increases beyond a certain
value, x starts to decrease, indicating that at higher ǫ MNO-0 buys less infrastructure.
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C. Effect of Varying the Transmit Power from BSs of MNO-0 per Unit Area
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Fig. 7: Coverage probability of MNO-0 when increasing the transmit power from BSs.
Fig. 7 illustrates the coverage probability of MNO-0 based on the scenario of Assumption
2.1. We plot the coverage probability when the transmit power of BSs of MNO-0 increases,
while setting the value of ǫ = 0.1. When there is no infrastructure sharing, we consider the
cases when λ0 is 5/(π × 5002) and 10/(π × 5002). Overall, we see the trend that the coverage
improves as the transmit power increases, but quickly saturates to 1/β ∼ 0.12. We also see that,
for fixed transmit power, when the BS intensity is denser, the coverage of MNO-0 is higher.
When the BSs of MNO-0 employ low transmit power, MNO-0 gains better coverage by sharing
infrastructure with the seller MNOs. We plot the case when MNO-0 buys infrastructure from
four sellers. However, the gain due to infrastructure sharing is very small and does not exceed
the upper bound of 1/β ∼ 0.12. For all the cases, when the BSs of MNO-0 increase their
transmit power, the maximum bound of coverage can be achieved easily. There is very little
gain for MNO-0, in terms of coverage, when buying more infrastructure while its BSs use a
high transmit power. This verifies Proposition 7 when p→∞.
D. Equilibrium Price and Quantity from the Sellers
In Figs. 8 and Fig. 9, we consider the case of two seller MNOs and the simulation parameters
are given as follows: the SINR threshold at the user of MNO-1 and MNO-2 are T = −15
dB and 5 dB, respectively. For the areal power consumption in (24), we set the fixed circuit
power of MNO-1 and MNO-2 as pc = 30 and 80, respectively. Also, the cost of power from
MNO-1 is a1 = 50 and from MNO-2 is a2 = 90 in (36). As such, it belongs to the case when
yk ≥ (c/pmax)2/α, for k = 1, 2 in (43).
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In Fig. 8, the market equilibrium is illustrated. The best response of seller MNO-1 to the action
of MNO-2 and vice versa can be obtained from (42). We plot the equilibrium quantity y∗ from
(43) with respect to y∗1 and y
∗
2 . Since yk = λkzk where 0 ≤ zk ≤ 1, the best response y∗k depends
on λk. For fixed value of λ1 = 10/(π × 5002) and varying λ2 = [10, 15, 20, 25, 30]/(π× 5002),
the equilibrium quantity y∗ decreases when λ2 increases. Similarly, we plot y∗ by varying λ1 =
[10, 15, 20, 25, 30]/(π×5002) while setting λ2 = 10/(π×5002). The best response of both MNO-
1 and MNO-2 are decreasing functions with respect to y = y1 + y2. Hence, the best responses
of MNOs decrease when y1 and y2 decrease. Also, the best response of MNO-1 (y
∗
1) decreases
when λ2 increases. Similarly, y
∗
2 decreases when λ1 increases. The intersection point of y
∗
1 and
y∗2 gives a single equilibrium quantity of the Cournot game.
The corresponding equilibrium price q∗ is obtained by computing q∗ = θ− ηy∗, which yields
a single equilibrium price for each y∗. The equilibrium price is plotted in Fig. 9 for different
marginal prices η. We consider (λ1, λ2) = [(10, 10), (10, 15), (15, 20), (15, 25)]/(π×5002). When
the equilibrium quantity increases, the equilibrium price will decrease due to the law of demand
in which the slope of the equilibrium price depends only on the marginal price. While the case
of two seller MNOs is considered in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, the case more than two seller MNOs is
given in Fig. 10.
E. Coverage Probability of MNO-0 After Buying Infrastructure at Market Clearing Price
Fig. 10 shows the coverage probability of a user of MNO-0 when it buys infrastructure at the
equilibrium of market clearing price. By employing Algorithm 2, all the seller MNOs sell y∗
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amount of infrastructure at the equilibrium price q∗. We consider the cases when the intensity
of BSs of MNO-0 is chosen as [5, 10, 15, 20, 25]/(π × 5002), and it buys from three, four, and
five seller MNOs. The cost θ = 500 and η = 5π× 5002. We observe that the coverage of a user
of MNO-0 improves when there are more seller MNOs in the market.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have studied the infrastructure trading problem for multiple seller MNOs and one buyer
MNO using stochastic geometry. We have considered two scenarios of infrastructure sharing.
Firstly, when every BS of seller MNOs serves a user from the buyer MNO. Secondly, when
only some BSs of each seller MNO serves at least one user from the buyer MNO. We have
first analyzed the coverage probability of a user of the buyer MNO, and studied the trade-
offs between infrastructure sharing and increasing of transmit power. We have then focused on
the strategy selection of the buyer and the competition among sellers. The strategy of a buyer
MNO is concerned about how many MNOs and which MNOs to buy infrastructure from in
order to satisfy its QoS. The objective of the buyer is to minimize the purchasing cost of the
infrastructure. The strategy selection problem of the buyer has been formulated as an optimization
problem and the optimal solution was found via Lagrange multiplier method. A greedy algorithm
has been proposed to compute the solution. The problem of pricing and finding the fraction of
infrastructure that sellers are willing to sell has been formulated using a Cournot-Nash oligopoly
game. One of our major conclusions is: infrastructure sharing can improve cellular coverage as
long as the interference and association are decoupled.
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